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IMMIGRATION AS AN INTRA-COMPANY TRANSFEREE
AND THE PITFALL OF THE CALIFORNIA
UNITARY TAX
Only a decade ago the term multinational corporation auto-
matically implied that a United States firm was doing business
abroad,' while today it may imply that a foreign firm is doing busi-
ness in the United States. During the 1970's, the major corpora-
tions of Europe and Asia - Philips of the Netherlands, Unilever of
Great Britain, Siemens and Thyssen of Germany, Mitsubishi and
Matsushita of Japan - began to significantly challenge American
corporations in their efforts to dominate the world marketplace.2
As American investment overseas diminished, foreign investment
in the United States skyrocketed.' In 1978 over 358 foreign firms
invested $40.9 billion in United States manufacturing.' This total
is the largest since World War II As economic and political un-
certainty proliferate abroad more and more foreign corporations
and entrepreneurs are finding the United States a desirable place in
which to live and invest.
While visiting the United States as temporary business visi-
tors,6 many foreign businessmen are attracted by the lower cost of
1. Brittain, Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S., 45 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 431
(1979).
2. Gray, The New Realities of Business, 45 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 536 (1979).
3. Jaffe, Foreign Investors in the U.S. - the Pace Quickens, FORBES, Apr. 2, 1979, at
73.
4. Foreign Direct Investment in the United States
Addition to foreign direct investment
Foreign direct investment position in position in the United States dur-
the United States at year-end 1978. ing 1978.
Billions Billions
of Dollars Percent of dollars Percent
4 largest positions:
Netherlands .......................... 9.8 23.9 1.9 31.1
United Kingdom ..................... 7.4 18.1 1.0 15.6
Canada ............................ 6.2 15.1 .5 8.3
Germany ............................ 3.2 7.8 .7 10.6
Other coutries ...................... 14.3 35.1 2.1 34.4
Total ....... .................. 40.9 ............. 6.2 .............
Sources: Survey of Current Business of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
5. Brittain, supra note 1, at 43 1.
6. Temporary visitors for business enter the United States on a B-I visa. This is per-
haps the most obvious type of nonimmigrant and by far the most numerous. To qualify, the
alien must satisfy three requirements: an unabandoned residence in a foreign country, a
1
Papas: Immigration as an Intra-Company Transferee and the Pitfall of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
IMMIGRATION AS AN INTRA-COMPANY TRANSFEREE
producing goods in the United States than in their home countries,
7
the size8 and growth potential of the United States market, and the
"bargain buys" their strong currencies now command. Hoping to
tap this lucrative market and fearful of political unrest at home,9
these businessmen often seek to relocate their families and them-
selves by establishing a business in the United States. Foreign ex-
ecutives frequently solicit advice from American counsel on how to
proceed before returning home.'" On the one hand, immigration
attorneys who deal with these alien businessmen are finding that
they must have a basic understanding of business and tax law if
they are to effectively serve these clients."l On the other hand, tax
attorneys are realizing they too must have a rudimentary under-
standing of immigration law.
The purpose of this Comment is to provide attorneys with a
more complete understanding of the complexity of the immigration
and state tax problems facing owners and shareholders of closely-
held foreign companies desiring to set up affiliated offices in the
United States, particularly in California. This Comment will first
present the history and changes in the immigration law with an ex-
planation of why the "intra-compahy transferee"' 2 has become one
of the more viable vehicles for foreign businessmen wishing to im-
migrate 3 to the United States. The promotion of foreign invest-
ment as the underlying policy of the law pertaining to intra-
company transferees will then be examined. Attention will then fo-
cus on the policy of the California unitary tax' 4 system and how it
temporary visit, and a mission for business or pleasure. I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 2.8a, at 2-55 (1979).
7. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 13, 1978, at 79.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Interview with Dennis Mukai, Esquire, Nishiyama, Mukai, Leewong & Henry, Los
Angeles, California (Jan. 15, 1980). Mr. Mukai practices immigration law.
I1. Id.
12. An intra-company transferee in this context is an alien who, immediately preceding
his admission into the United States, has been employed continuously for one year by a
foreign or United States firm in a managerial or executive capacity, or in a position requiring
specialized knowledge. The alien must seek to enter the United States on a temporary basis
(one to three years) to render services to the same employer firm. See notes 29-36 infra and
accompanying text.
13. By seeking temporary or permanent residency. GORDON & ROSENFELD, supra note
6, § 2.1b, at 2-13.
14. Several states, notably California, employ a unitary method of taxation to determine
the amount of taxable income of a multinational corporation doing business in the state. To
compute the amount of taxes owing to the state the worldwide income of the corporation is
multiplied by a percentage that corresponds to the amount of property, payroll and sales that
2
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frustrates the Congressional intent behind the immigration law.
Owners of closely-held foreign companies seeking to establish a
branch office 5 or subsidiary 6 of the international enterprise in
California may encounter adverse state tax consequences. A chil-
ling effect upon investment in California is the unfortunate result.
The detrimental consequences of the state unitary tax upon the in-
ternational business relations of the United States and its possible
Constitutional ramifications will then be discussed. Finally, this
Comment will recommend present and long-term solutions to the
policy conflicts between federal immigration law and state tax law.
I. IMMIGRATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALIEN EMPLOYEES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES
A. Obtaining Temporary Residence in the United States as an
Intra-Company Transferee
In order to understand the application of immigration law to
foreign executives seeking to relocate in the United States, a brief
explanation of the immigration quota system is necessary. In addi-
tion, the various methods of securing temporary or permanent resi-
dence in the United States need to be discussed.
Current immigration law allows 290,000 individuals to become
permanent residents of or immigrants 7 to the United States annu-
ally. Under the "quota" or numerical limitation system, aliens are
divided into two categories: (1) Immigrants - those seeking per-
manent residence and (2) Nonimmigrants - those admitted for
the company has in the state. This income amount may substantially differ from the actual
income amount earned if the company's in-state activities were treated separately from its
out-of-state activities. See notes 93-108 infra and accompanying text.
Several articles have appeared regarding the federal taxation of resident and nonresi-
dent aliens. See Navarro, Do's and Don'ts in Tax Planningfor Nonresident Aliens, 117
TRUSTS & EST. 484 (1978); Rosenberg & Packman, Taxation of Foreign Executives in the
U.S., 57 TAXES 9 (1979); Shaw, Controlled Foreign Corporations. Determining Control Under
Subpart F, II CORNELL INT'L L.J. 343 (1978); Sturm, Taxation of the Foreign Investor in the
United States, 55 TAXES 542 (1977).
15. A branch office is a subdivision of a single corporation. It will often be referred to
as an affiliated or related corporation throughout this Comment. An affiliate is a person
directly or indirectly controlled by a common owner. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(a) (1980).
16. A subsidiary is a company directly or indirectly controlled by another company
owning all or a majority of its shares. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(u) (1980). For purposes of immi-
gration law, the definition of subsidiary and affiliate remain unsettled. See notes 47-69 infra
and accompanying text.
17. Immigrants are those who come for permanent stay in the United States and who
eventually may be naturalized as American citizens. Nonimmigrants are those admitted for
temporary sojourn. GORDON & ROSENFELD, supra note 6, § 2. 1b, at 2-13.
Vol. I11
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temporary stay. 8 Every alien is presumed by law to be an immi-
grant unless he can establish that he is a nonimmigrant.' 9 A non-
immigrant is not subject to the quota, whereas an immigrant is
required to conform to numerical restrictions and to stricter docu-
mentation requirements, since no more than 20,000 immigrants per
country are allowed to immigrate in any one year.20
The quota system classifies immigrants into seven different
preferences or priorities, 2' each consisting of a certain percentage of
the overall 20,000 "allotted" to each country.2 2 Any portion of the
yearly quota not used by the seven preference groups becomes the
eighth preference or "nonpreference" category under which other
qualified immigrants may apply.23 One "nonpreference" category
consists of aliens desiring to become immigrants or permanent
United States residents by investing $40,000.00 in a business in
which they will be a principal manager.
24
Many foreign businessmen with the requisite $40,000.00 have
18. During its first hundred years the United States placed no limits on immigration.
The Temporary Quota Act of 1921 was enacted in response to demands for numerical limita-
tions on immigration. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, known as the McCar-
ran-Walter Act, subsequently codified all immigration laws into one statute. Id. § 2.1 a, at 2-
1I. Restrictions on immigration sought to achieve two purposes: To reduce the number of
immigrants and to preserve the racial balance of our population. Id. § 2.5(a), at 2-41.
19. Id. § 2.25, at 2-182.26.
20. The statutory system of classification has crucial significance in a number of re-
spects:
I. It facilitates the administration of the immigration system.
2. It controls the terms and the documents under which an alien may be admitted;
otherwise he may be subject to exclusion.
3. It determines the scope of the entrant's activities in the United States.
4. It determines eligibility for naturalization.
Id. § 2.5b, at 2-43. The following aliens are excluded from the quota system: "immediate
relatives" (spouses, minor children and parents of United States citizens), and "special immi-
grants." Id. § 2.18(c), at 2-138, & §§ 2.19-.24, at 2-181.
21. a) First preference: unmarried sons and daughters of United States citizens. Id.
§ 2.27b, at 2-194.
b) Second preference: spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of lawfully resi-
dent aliens. Id. § 2.27c, at 2-196.
c) Third preference: professionals, scientists, artists. Id. § 2.27d, at 2-197.
d) Fourth preference: married sons and daughters of United States citizens. Id.
§ 2.27e, at 2-205.
e) Fifth preference: brothers and sisters of United States citizens. Id. § 2.27f, at 2-
206.
I) Sixth preference: immigrants coming to perform labor. Id. § 2.27g, at 2-209.
g) Seventh preference: refugees. Id. § 2.27h, at 2-211.
22. Id. § 2.27a, at 2-193.
23. Id. § 2.27i, at 2-224.
24. Business investor: One coming to engage in a commercial or agricultural enterprise
in which he has invested, or is actively in the process of investing, capital totalling at least
$40,000 in an enterprise in the United States in which he will be a principal manager and
4
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become aware of this investor category25 and would prefer to immi-
grate to the United States in this manner.26 Unfortunately, because
the seven preference categories are becoming increasingly ex-
hausted,27 visas in the "business investor" category are currently
unavailable and will remain so for the indefinite future.28
The most viable substitute to the investment alternative under
present law is immigration as an intra-company transferee. This
temporary visa category was established by Congress in 1970 and it
defines an intra-company transferee (L-1) as:
(L) an alien who, immediately preceding the time of his applica-
tion for admission into the United States, has been employed
continuously for one year by a firm or corporation or other legal
entity or an affiliate or subsidiary thereof and who seeks to enter
the United States temporarily in order to continue to render his
services to the same employer or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof
in a capacity that is managerial, executive, or involves special-
ized knowledge, ... 29
The purpose of the law was two-fold. First, to facilitate tem-
porary admission to the United States of executive, managerial,
and specialist personnel of international enterprises. Second, to en-
courage foreign investment in the United States by allowing foreign
corporations to set up affiliates in this country.3" Prior to the enact-
ment of the statute foreign employees could not be admitted for
temporary assignment to a United States-based affiliate of a foreign
or American company.3' Notwithstanding their intention to re-
main temporarily in the United States,3 2 alien employees were
forced to apply for permanent rather than temporary visas.33 This
resulted in an "oversubscription" of resident visas and a lengthy
waiting period for those executives seeking a transfer to the United
which will employ a person or persons in the United States who are American citizens or
lawful resident aliens. 8 C.F.R. § 212(b)(4) (1980); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(14) (1952).
25. Id.
26. Interview with D. Mukai, supra note 10.
27. Yonemura & Ungar, Representation of Foreign Inrestors and International Person-
nel, 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 491, 492 (1979).
28. Id. at 492.
29. 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(L) (1970).
30. S.2593, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 116 CoNG. REC. 31 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1970).
31. No such provisions existed. Id. at 1422.
32. A significant number of foreign nationals who may be brought to the United States
by international companies either intend to return to their home countries or go to third
countries in higher management positions. H.R. REP. No. 91-851, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2750,
2752 (1970).
33. It is significant to note that United States corporations generally do not experience
similar difficulties in transferring personnel from the United States to other countries. Id.
Vol. I11
5
Papas: Immigration as an Intra-Company Transferee and the Pitfall of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
IMMIGRATION AS AN INTRA-COMPANY TRANSFEREE
States.34 This "undue delay" in immigration procedures seriously
hampered "normal business operations,"35 and it was hoped that
this legislation would remedy the situation.36
1. The Intra- Company Transferee.- Employee or Entrepreneur?
The California Problem. The Congressional history indicates that
the employer "firm, corporation or other legal entity" was intended
to include partnerships, sole proprietorships, and labor organiza-
tions.37 Thus, if a foreign businessman were the owner of a closely-
held company, he could have someone with the requisite intra-
company transferee qualifications 38 sent to the United States to join
an already existing office or to set one up.39 Alternatively, he could
leave someone in charge of the home office and transfer himself. A
valid business reason for his United States office must exist, or the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)4 ° might view the en-
tire transaction as a sham and deny the L-1 visa application.4
The Western Regional office of the INS42 has recently assumed
an anti-business stance which severely restricts owners and share-
holders of closely-held companies who seek to avail themselves of
L-I status. On October 31, 1979, the Western office denied an L-I
visa to a one-third owner of a London-based investment holding
company who was to become President of an Arizona subsidiary
engaged in the same business.43 The Regional office held that the
34. Delays of a year or more have resulted. Id. at 2754.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2755.
37. "It is anticipated that the words 'firm' and 'legal entity' will be interpreted in the
broad sense to include all bona fide forms of business organizations including partnerships,
sole proprietorships and labor organizations." See supra note 30, at 2793.
38. A manager, executive or one with specialized knowledge. See note 29 supra.
39. The corporation need not have an established United States office before intra-com-
pany transferee status is granted. As long as a bona fide intent to begin business in the
United States can be shown, the petition will be approved. Matter of LeBlanc, 13 Int. Dec.
816 (B.I.A. 1971).
40. The Immigration and Naturalization Service headquarters is known as the Central
Office and is located in Washington, D.C. The Central office has the authority to review
decisions of the Regional offices under 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(e) (1980). The INS is a division of
the Department of Justice. GORDON & ROSENFELD, supra note 6, § 1.9a, at 1-45.
41. Yonemura & Ungar, supra note 27, at 500.
42. A reorganization of the INS resulted in a decentralization of all case work from the
Central Office in Washington, D.C. to four regional offices: the Eastern Regional Office in
Burlington, Vt.; the Northern Regional Office, in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.; the
Southern Regional Office in Dallas, Texas; and the Western Regional Office in San Pedro,
California. GORDON & ROSENFELD, supra note 6, § 1.9b, at 1-46. See also 8 CFR § 100.4(a)
(1980).
43. Matter of Aphrodite Investment Ltd., 17 Int. Dec. - Int. Dec. No. 2826 (B.I.A. 1980),
rev'd, Acting Associate Commissioner's decision (August 22, 1980). See also Amicus Curiae
6
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word "employed" as used in the L- 1 statute means employee and
not owner, stockholder or partner in the United States or foreign
organization and that the Congressional purpose behind the L-1
statute was to aid "larger international corporations in the transfer
of key managers, executives and employees. . . ." and not to allow
entrepreneurs to immigrate under the L-1 status." This position
was contrary to that taken by other regional offices.
Upon review by the Central Office, in Washington, this deci-
sion was reversed and the L- 1 visa was granted.45 Relying upon an
earlier decision which held that a sole stockholder of a corporation
was able to be employed by that corporation as the corporation has
a separate legal entity from its owners or even its sole owner, the
Central Office reasoned that "if we were to adopt the definition of
employee [that the Western Regional Office has suggested,] we
would exclude some of the very people the statute intends to bene-
fit: executives." As the Central Office's decision is a precedent de-
cision it is binding upon the Western Regional Office."6
2. Required Company Relationships to Accomodate Transferee
Status. Affiliate or Subsidiary. The statute grants L- 1 status to an
alien who has been employed by a "firm. . .or an affiliate or sub-
sidiary thereof. . . . There is a split of authority among the Re-
gions concerning the criteria necessary to establish affiliation48
between two firms or corporations. Some intra-company financial
interest must be shown through stock ownership by one company
or by the individual shareholders in its affiliate or sister company,
but exactly how much financial control is needed remains unset-
tled. Some decisions hold that a majority stock ownership in one
company by the parent is required for two companies to be affili-
ated, 9 while other decisions hold that a franchise and licensing
brief for beneficiary, at 3, Matter of Aphrodite Investment Ltd., 17 Int. Dec. - Int. Dec. No.
2826 (1980). A copy of the brief is available from the office of the Association of Immigra-
tion and Nationality Lawyers, 233 Broadway, New York, New York.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id.
46. "In addition to the decisions of the Attorney General and the Board, ... Service
Officers decisions selected by the Commissioner shall serve as precedents in all proceedings
involving the same issue or issues and, except as they may be modified or overruled by
subsequently selected decisions, shall be binding on all officers and employees of the Service
in the administration of the Act." 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(e) (1980); 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1952).
47. For the definition of affiliate and subsidiary see notes 15-16 supra.
48. Mailman, Intra-Company Transferees, 55 INTERPRETER RELEASES 223, 225, 230-31
(1978).
49. Matter of Makedent, Inc., LOS-N-20054, Western Region, as cited in Yonemura &
Ungar, supra note 27, at 500. This case is unpublished, and to date is unavailable. The
Vol. I I
7
Papas: Immigration as an Intra-Company Transferee and the Pitfall of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
IMMIGRATION AS AN INTRA-COMPANY TRANSFEREE
agreement from the same parent between two otherwise unrelated
companies will constitute affiliation."
In Matter of Makedent Inc. , a recent controversial case from
the Western Region, it was held that the parent company must have
a majority ownership interest in another company in order to con-
sider them affiliates. 2 The effect of this opinion is to equate "affili-
ate" with "subsidiary." Under this decision foreign companies
hoping to establish an affiliate in California must own a majority
interest in the California firm for intra-company transfer purposes.
This interpretation poses problems since two companies may be af-
filiated without majority ownership in the foreign company.5 3 Pres-
ent day business practice indicates that when two or more
companies exchange research information, personnel, and advertis-
ing techniques, they will be deemed affiliates even in the absence of
majority ownership.54
The Eastern Region 55 has taken a contrary view, holding that
when other elements of control are present, majority ownership is
not necessary for two companies to be affiliated. In that decision a
major communications company owned a fifty percent interest in
one cable manufacturer and forty-three percent interest in another.
The communications company had an officer on the board of both
firms who was responsible for transferring executive personnel and
setting guidelines for technological, financial, and operating deci-
sions between the two firms.56 In the Regional Officer's opinion the
two cable manufacturers were considered affiliates because the
communications company was held to have exercised sufficient
control over both.57
general area is difficult to research because most of the later decisions have been made by
Regional Commissioners of the various Regional Offices of the INS and are unpublished. It
is difficult to obtain these decisions because they are kept filed chronologically in the reading
rooms in the various district offices of the INS. Interview with D. Mukai, supra note 10.
50. Chicago Budget Rent-A-Car, CHI-N-9357 (May 18, 1979), as cited in Fragomen,
The Temporary Visa Categories.- The Petition Classes, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
TWELFTH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 88 (1979).
51. See note 49 supra. California is in the Western Region. GORDON & ROSENFELD,
supra note 6, § 1.96, at 1-46.
52. See note 47 supra.
53. Id.
54. See notes 114-26 infra.
55. Matter of _ , NYC-N-55808 (1977), as cited in Mailman, supra note 48, at
230, 233 n.3. This decision is unpublished and to date is unavailable.
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In another decision from the Eastern Region5" affiliation was
found to exist on the basis of a proposed joint venture. In that case
an American firm successfully transferred an executive from its
British partner to the United States. 59 Although neither firm re-
tained a financial interest in the other, their contract to enter into a
joint enterprise provided the necessary connection to support a
finding of affiliation.60
There are, however, two Eastern Region cases which have held
the requisite company connections lacking. In Matter of Schick6'
an American firm entered into a contract with a French firm for an
exclusive ten-year license to import into the United States machin-
ery to manufacture nylon zippers.62 The American firm was unable
to relocate a French technician to its plant as an intra-company
transferee 63 because the relationship between the two firms was
merely contractual and did not imply any joint ownership.' More-
over, the technician was not employed in a managerial capacity.65
The other Eastern Region case which found the requisite com-
pany connections inadequate involved the owners of Del Mar Ben,
Inc., a Japanese steak house in New York who wanted to open an-
other one in a nearby town.66 Del Mar Ben applied to bring a na-
tive Japanese chef from Hi Cock, Inc., the claimed affiliate in
Japan, to the United States as an intra-company transferee. 67 De-
spite stock ownership and an agreement to furnish goods and serv-
ices, the Regional Commissioner denied the L-1 visa because Del
Mar Ben and Hi Cock did not exercise sufficient financial control
over one another to constitute an affiliation.68
In order to provide clarity and to facilitate investment, the




61. Matter of Schick, 13 Int. Dec. 647 (B.I.A. 1970).
62. Id. at 648.
63. Id. at 649.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. In Matter of Del Mar Ben, Inc., Int. Dec. No. 2303 (1974).
67. The owner claimed that "recently arrived nonassimilated" Japanese chefs were nec-
essary to provide the "maximum Japanese authenticity and flavor." Id.
68. The two companies had an informal agreement whereby Hi Cock would provide
chopsticks, saki, rice, china bowls and kimonos for the new restaurant. Del Mar Ben, in
return, planned to furnish Hi Cock with supplies to open pizza houses in Japan. Since
neither company had made direct financial investments in the other, it was held that no
financial control existed. Id. at 2.
Vol. I I
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meaning of the term affiliate needs to be further defined and more
consistently applied by the Regional Offices. As mentioned earlier,
the Makedent decision requires companies wishing to invest in Cal-
ifornia to own more than fifty percent of the California branch or
subsidiary. This is unrealistic in light of present-day business prac-
tices. It is urged that in the absence of majority ownership, contrac-
tual and other business relationships,69 such as exchange and
sharing of personnel, interlocking directorates, exchange of re-
search information and advertising techniques, be deemed a close
enough affiliation for purposes of the law. As will be shown in the
following section, the fifty-percent ownership requirement may re-
sult in some adverse state tax consequences to the foreign enter-
prise.
B. Prerequisitesfor the Individual Transferee
For an alien to be granted L- I status7° he must have been em-
ployed for at least one year as either a manager or executive, or in a
capacity involving specialized knowledge essential to the busi-
ness.7 In deciding whether or not the alien's experience qualifies
as managerial, his salary and supervisory duties will be consid-
ered.72 Positions such as manager for Far Eastern operations,7 3 and
service parts and operations manager74 have qualified as executive
and managerial assignments respectively.
Pursuant to the statute75 it is required that the alien have a
total year's experience with the firm "outside" the United States.
This condition has been interpreted to mean that part of the year's
employment may be spent physically in the United States. In Mat-
ter of Continental Grain Company,7 6 the employer firm wanted to
transfer an employee from its Canadian subsidiary to the United
States to work as a grain merchandiser.77 During the preceding
year the employee had been a trainee in the United States for the
69. See the following textual section. Two recent decisions from the Eastern Region,
Matter of Warburg Paribus Becker, NYC-N, 60780 (Reg. Comm. July 25, 1980) and Matter
of Worldwide Marine, Inc., NYC-NG, 2056 (D.D. N.Y.C. May 5, 1980) support this view.
70. Visa classification for an intra-company transferee GORDON & ROSENFELD, supra
note 6, § 2.16b, at 2-129.
71. 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(15)(L) (1970). See note 29 supra.
72. Fragomen, supra note 50, at 86.
73. Matter of Bocris, 13 Int. Dec. 601 (B.I.A. 1970).
74. Matter of Vallaincourt, 14 Int. Dec. 654 (B.I.A. 1970).
75. 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(15) (L) (1970).
76. Matter of Continental Grain Company, 14 Int. Dec. 140 (B.I.A. 1972).
77. Id.
10
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first five months and had returned to Canada for the remaining
seven months.78 In light of Congress' intent to facilitate the entry
into the United States of foreign managers, executives, and special-
ists, this was not regarded as interruptive of the one year require-
ment.
In a recent decision from the Northern Region79 intra-com-
pany transferee status was granted to a qualified alien who was
present in the United States as a business visitor while receiving
compensation from the foreign office. Based on this holding the
one year requirement may be liberally interpreted as allowing only
a nominal stay abroad, so long as the compensation comes from the
foreign office.
1. Obtaining Permanent Residency as an Intra- Company Trans-
feree. While the intra-company transferee can become a temporary
United States resident under the L- 1 statute, as of 1977 it is also
possible to become a permanent resident under Department of La-
bor regulations.8 0 By following the Department's regulations,
many intra-company transferees already present in the United
States can "adjust" their status to that of permanent resident should
they so desire.
Although the wording of the regulations is similar to that of
the statute granting L- I status,81 there are some important subtle
differences. The Department of Labor regulations refer to interna-
tional "corporations or organizations," in contrast to the more va-
ried wording of "firm, corporation, affiliate or subsidiary" used in
the L- 1 classification. Limiting the choice of entity through which
to become a permanent resident or immigrant seems consistent
with the underlying policy of the immigration law of subjecting im-
migrants to the quota system while allowing nonimmigrants to fall
without the quota system because of the temporary nature of their
78. Id. at 141.
79. Matter of Ashby, File NYC-N-56125 (Oct. 27, 1978), as cited in PRACTISINO LAW
INSTITUTE, TWELFTH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE, at 88
(1979).
80. Schedule A, Group IV:
(1) Aliens who have been admitted to the United States in order to work, and who
are currently working in managerial or executive positions with the same interna-
tional corporations or organizations with which they were continuously employed
for one year before they were admitted; and
(2) Aliens who will be engaged in the United States in managerial or executive
ositions with the same international corporations or organizations with which they
ave been continuously employed for the immediately prior year.
20 C.F.R. § 656.10(d) (1980); 8 U.S.C. 1182 (14) (1952).
81. See note 29supra.
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stay.82 Further, it is unclear from the language of the regulations
whether sole proprietorships are included. Although there is no
precedent, it may be argued that a sole proprietorship is an "organi-
zation" if it has two or more offices, including one in the United
States. Thus, if a closely-held foreign corporation establishes a
branch or subsidiary in the United States, the owner could transfer
-himself to the United States and qualify for permanent resident sta-
tus.
83
Another difference between the L-1 and the labor regulation
classifications is the nature of the employee's qualifying position.
The Department of Labor regulations are more restrictive, applying
only to managers and executives, not to employees with specialized
knowledge.84 Therefore, an individual with expertise, such as an
accountant or engineer, cannot qualify for permanent residency
under the regulations because he is neither a manager nor an exec-
utive.85
The Department of Labor would like the regulations to be
amended to require the American branch office or subsidiary to be
in existence at least one year before the alien executive or manager
is eligible for permanent residence.8 6 This amendment represents
an effort to correct what seems to be a "circumvention" of the over-
subscribed quota by business investors. 87 In contrast, the intra-
company transferee intending to reside temporarily in the United
States is not required to come to an already existing office; 88 so long
as the petitioning company evidences "the bona fides of its in-
tended operation" in the United States, such as acquiring physical
premises, the L-1 petition will be approved.
82. See notes 18-21 supra.
83. Interview with D. Mukai, supra note 10.
84. See note 80 supra for the wording of the regulations.
85. Id.
86. Bodin, Labor Cerifications, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, TWELFTH ANNUAL IM-
MIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 191, 203 (1979).
87. [l~t has become apparent to us that there are aliens who qualify for an L visa
whom we did not intend for Schedule A certification. It was not our intent, to
include aliens coming to the United States to form a new corporation, such as in-
vestors who use Group IV to circumvent the unavailability of nonpreference
number, or aliens who were not managers and executives during their prior year of
employment.
Id.
88. Matter of LeBlanc, supra note 39.
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II. STATE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF SETTING UP
AN AMERICAN OFFICE
Owners or shareholders of closely-held foreign companies who
contemplate using the intra-company transferee method for immi-
grating to the United States should be aware that the majority own-
ership requirement under the immigration laws and California tax
laws presents a serious dilemma. As was shown in the previous
section, an intra-company transferee must relocate to a United
States based affiliate of a foreign company to qualify for L- 1 sta-
tus. 89 The Makedent 90 decision has rigidly interpreted affiliation to
mean literally majority ownership of the American Company by
the foreign firm. This presents a problem for the foreign company
attempting to avoid the application of California's unitary tax. If,
in order to avoid the unitary tax, the foreign company owned fifty
percent or less of its California enterprise, its executive and mana-
gerial transferees would be ineligible for L- 1 status. On the other
hand, if the foreign company owned more than fifty percent of the
California business to qualify its executives for L- 1 status, then the
two companies and perhaps a portion of the profits of other over-
seas affiliates may be subject to California income tax if the busi-
ness is considered unitary.
A unitary business is one which is carried on partly within and
partly without the taxing jurisdiction.9 The unitary tax is most on-
erous to the foreign-owned enterprise beginning activities within
California. Initially, newly-established businesses usually operate
at a loss or at a minimal profit rate due to start-up costs and other
factors. While a net operating loss will result in no taxes owed in
most jurisdictions, in California taxes may still be due based upon
the worldwide profits of the foreign parent or affiliated corpora-
tion.92
89. See note 29 supra.
90. See notes 51-54 supra.
91. Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept of/theAllocation ofIncome, 12 HASTINGS
L.J. 42, 46 (1960). 18 Cal. Adm. Reg. 25101 (1955) defines a unitary business as "one where
the operations for the portions of the business within the state is dependent upon or contribu-
tory to the operation of business outside the state." See also text accompanying notes 109-26
infra.
92. Sony Corporation ran into the ironic situation of seeing its estimated California
state income tax liability (calculated on a worldwide unitary basis) soar when it added a
television picture tube plant to its color television set assembly plant in San Diego. Unfortu-
nately, United States (but not worldwide) earnings were down due to start-up costs, creating
the ludicrous situation of an increase in California income taxes even while earnings de-
clined. Hearing on HA. 5076 Before the Committee on House Ways and Means, 96th Cong.,
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In order to understand the principles of the unitary method of
taxation, it would be useful to consider the following example:
A closely-held foreign manufacturing and export concern has
annual worldwide sales averaging $6,000,000. Desiring to in-
crease its exports to the United States, the company has recently
concluded that the West Coast, particularly California, would be
a good place from which to penetrate the United States market.
A California subsidiary, fifty-one percent owned by the family
corporation and forty-nine percent owned by the owner's son is
set up. The company accountant has prepared the following
pro-forma financial statement of the subsidiary's activities for
the first fiscal year:
SALES BREAKDOWN
Foreign parent California subsidiary
California sales $ 1,000,000 $1,200,000
Other sales $ 5,000,000 -0-
Total $ 6,000,000 $1,200,000
INCOME STATEMENT
Foreign parent California subsidiary
Sales $ 6,000,000 $1,200,000
Cost of sales $ 5,000,000 ($1,000,000)
Expenses $ 200,000 ($ 300,000)
Net Income $ 800,000 ($ 100,000) loss
$700,000-total worldwide net income of the enterprise
ALLOCATION FACTORS FOR THE UNITARY GROUP
Worldwide California subsidiary
Sales $ 6,200,000 $1,200,000
Property $20,000,000 $ 500,000
Payroll $ 450,000 $ 150,000
Under the separate accounting method9 3 the subsidiary's busi-
2d Sess. 209 (1980) (statement of the Sony Corp. of America) [hereinafter cited as Hearing on
H.R. 5076]. The unitary approach to taxation of income allocable to the state "assumes that
profit rates in different units of a multinational corporation are the same, even if the facts
clearly demonstrate start-up losses." Caveney, UK.- U.S. Income Tax Treaty and U.K. Tax
Planning. 1978 Update, INTERNATIONAL TAX INSTITUTE (1978).
93. Ordinarily states restrict taxation of domestic and foreign corporations to sources
within the taxing state. If a corporation derives income from activities within and outside the
state, the income from the in-state activities will be segregated from that of the company as a
whole by an accounting method known as separate accounting. In this fashion, the income is
determined as though the corporation's entire operation were confined solely to that state.
Keesling & Warren, supra note 9 1, at 43. Comment, Taxation of the Multistate Business.- The
Ownership Requirement of the Unitary Concept, 14 CALIF. W. L. REV. 92 (1978).
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2 [], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol11/iss2/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
ness activities within California would be treated "separately and
distinct" from the parent's activities outside the state. Since it oper-
ated at a loss for the taxable year, the subsidiary would realize no
income subject to the California franchise tax.94 However, if the
business is treated as unitary, under the formula method of ac-
counting,95 the parent corporation's worldwide income would be
included in the calculation of the subsidiary's California tax liabil-
ity96 in the following manner.
First, the portion of the parent's worldwide income that is sub-
ject to taxation in California must be determined. To do this, the
average of the percentages for each of the three allocation factors
for the year is computed. The ratios of each of the allocation
figures are then added together and divided by three, resulting in
an apportionment factor of twenty percent.97 The twenty percent is
then multiplied by the company's worldwide net income of
$700,000 to give $140,000,98 the amount of worldwide income to be
allocated to the California subsidiary. The $140,000 would in turn
be multiplied by the California state tax rate of 9.6 percent.99 The
subsidiary would now owe $13,440 in California taxes for the given
year. Thus, under the unitary concept, the subsidiary would be
94. A franchise tax is imposed on California corporations and on foreign corporations
doing business in California. This tax is imposed for the privilege of exercising the corporate
franchise for the taxable year. J. HARGROVE, CALIFORNIA TAXES § 2.1 (1978).
95. Most states compute unitary business income by an apportionment formula known
as the Massachusetts formula. In California this formula consists of three income-producing
or allocation factors: 1) property: the average value of real and tangible property; 2) payroll:
wages, salaries and other employee benefits; 3) sales: gross sales less return allowances. Id
at § 2.67. The law provides that allocation and apportionment of income is required where
business activities are taxable within and outside California. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
25129-25136 (Deering's 1970).
96. The effect of including the parent's worldwide income into the determination of the
subsidiary's state tax liability is to provide California with a larger tax basis. This results in a
higher amount of taxes owed. Interview with William K. Norman, Esq., Finley, Kumble,
Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Los Angeles, California (January 25, 1980). Mr. Norman spe-









.19 + .083 + .33
3 .20 (apportionment factor)
HARGROVE, supra note 94, § 2.72, at 163.
98. $700,000 x .20 = $140,000. See Interview with William Norman, supra note 96.
99. $140,000 x 9.6 = $13,440. Id.
Vol. I11
15
Papas: Immigration as an Intra-Company Transferee and the Pitfall of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
IMMIGRATION AS AN INTRA-COMPANY TRANSFEREE
subject to California income taxation even though it operated at a
loss.
In addition to an increase in the amount of taxes owing, the
foreign parent may incur "horrendous administrative burdens."' °
In order to measure the income of all of its overseas subsidiaries
and affiliates, the foreign parent will have to wade through a com-
plex maze of diversity of language, currency translations, tax laws
and accounting practices.' °' "While this is bad enough for the
American multinational, it is even worse for the foreign parent." 1
02
An American multinational has to measure its worldwide income
since it is required to file a federal income tax return every year.
This is not so for the foreign parent. 103 Furthermore, the release of
certain tax information may violate the laws of foreign jurisdic-
tions.'4 For example, if a California aerospace company needs in-
come and expense information from its British subsidiary and there
is a British law prohibiting a taxpayer from releasing this informa-
tion because the work is defense related, this information would be
unavailable to the California company.'05 Finally, the cost of addi-
tional "paperwork"'' 06 incurred in reporting the company's world-
wide income will be passed along to the consumer'0 7 and ultimately
hinder the California subsidiary from effectively competing in the
United States domestic market.
0 8
A. Tests for Finding a Unitary Business
1. Common Ownership. A unitary business for California tax
purposes must have common ownership, directly or indirectly, of
more than fifty percent of the company's voting stock. 'I The own-
ership requirement applies not only to parent-subsidiary compa-
nies, but also to affiliated companies, i.e., those not directly related
to each other but which possess common shareholders. 0 The fifty
100. Hearing on HR. 5076, supra note 92, at 165 (statement of Paul W. Cook on Behalf





105. Id. at 171.
106. Id.
107. Petersen & Walsh, U.S: The Impact of the California Unitary Business Concept on
the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 3 INTERTAX 107, 115 (1978).
108. Id.
109. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25105 (Deering's 1970).
110. See notes 15-16 supra.
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percent requirement has been liberally construed to mean that in
the absence of a majority interest by one company in an affiliate,
controlling ownership will be deemed to exist if there is supervision
over "operational matters.""' For example, in the case of Appeal of
Signal Oil and Gas Company " 2 the parent company did not own a
majority interest in the subsidiary, but because it controlled the
prices of the products the subsidiary sold, the State Board of Equal-
ization (SBE) found sufficient "controlling ownership" to establish
a unitary relationship.113
2. Unity of Use and Unity of Operation. Once the ownership
requirement is established, a unitary business will be found if ei-
ther: 1) the business's commercial activities within California con-
tribute to and are dependent upon its activities outside the state," 4
or 2) there is a unity of ownership, use, and operation between the
California company and other members of the group.'
The California tax authorities tend to balance several elements
in determining whether either of these two tests has been met.
Unity of operation includes central purchasing," 16 advertising, ac-
counting, and financing.' " Unity of use is evidenced by a central-
ized executive force and interlocking directorates.' 18 In Butler Bros.
v. McClogan,1  one of the leading California cases defining a uni-
tary business, the court reasoned that because centralization of cor-
porate services such as accounting, advertising, and purchasing
I11. Zak, Current Unitary Tax Developments, 80 INT'L TAX REP. 1, 2 (1980).
112. CAL. TAX. REP. (CCH) 242-247 (S.B.E. 1970).
113. Id.
114. Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 417, 424-25, 386 P.2d 40, 34
Cal. Rptr. 532 (1963).
115. Butler Bros. v. McClogan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, il P.2d 334 (1941), aff'd 315 U.S.
501 (1942).
116. Purchasing the same products or raw materials and components. Edison California
Stores v. McClogan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947).
117. For example, if one company loans money to another even though it could have
borrowed from lending institutions. Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Board, 7
Cal. App. 3d 99, 86 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1970), reh'g denied, 10 Cal. App. 3d 496, 87 Cal. Rptr. 239
(1970), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 400 U.S. 961 (1970).
118. The integration of executive forces is a significant element in determining whether
unity of use exists.
Chief executives of large organizations are regarded as highly prized acquisitions.
They are induced to join a corporation, or to remain with it,. . . not only by gener-
ous salaries, but also in many cases by incentive plans of various kinds. For a
subsidiary corporation to have the assistance and direction of high executive au-
thority of [its parent] is an invaluable resource.
10 Cal. App. 3d at 504, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
119. 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941). This case was decided before the California
statute defining a unitary business was enacted.
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resulted in a lower cost per unit when spread out over several stores
of the same business, a unitary business was held to exist. 1
20
On the other hand, if the operation conducts different types of
businesses in various states, a unitary business will not be found. In
Appeal of Allied Properties'21 a hotel operation in California and a
cattle ranch in Nevada were considered to be two distinct busi-
nesses, even though both had a common owner. ' 22 The SBE 23 rea-
soned that due to their diverse needs, unrelated businesses "do not
lend themselves to centralization of functions";124 the economic
benefit to be gained from such centralization is at a "minimum."'
1 25
Similarly, if the various divisions within an organization operate
independently of one another, the requisite "interdependence of
business activities"' 126 will not exist and no unitary business will be
found.
It has been contended by American and foreign executives
27
that the two tests 28 used to determine whether a business is unitary
are "arbitrary, unreasonable and inherently vague ''129 in their ap-
plication. Instead of a "clear and understandable objective stan-
dard for a unitary group,"' 131 the California state tax authorities 3 '
tend to balance several elements 32 in determining whether unity of
use and operation exists. Thus, the final determination of whether
120. The court enunciated the three unities test for determining whether a unitary busi-
ness exists: unity of use, ownership and operation. 17 Cal. 2d at 678, 111 P.2d at 341.
121. CAL. TAX. REP. (CCH) $ 202-416 (S.B.E. 1964).
122. Id.
123. The State Board of Equalization is an administrative agency which hears appeals
from the FTB of claims for refunds. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 26077 (Deering's 1970) and
claims for deficiency assessments CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 25667 (Deering's 1970).
124. "For example, due to differences in the transactions to be recorded, there is little to
be gained by centralizing the accounting functions of a hotel and a ranch. In a situation of
that kind 'centralized accounting' is an empty phrase." Appeal of Allied Properties, supra
note 121.
125. Id.
126. Appeal of Lear Siegler, Inc., CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 202-633 (S.B.E. 1967).
127. Coco-Cola Co., Honeywell Inc., Dutch Employers Federation, Sony Corp., Xerox
Corp., Volkswagen of America, Inc., are but a few. See Hearing on H.R. 5076, supra note 92.
128. Unity of ownership, use and operation and whether interdependency exists between
affiliated corporations in their various functions, see notes 114-26 supra.
129. Hearing on H.R. 5076, supra note 92, at 169, 183.
130. Id. at 169.
131. The tax authorities include the courts, the Franchise Tax Board (FTB), and the
State Board of Equalization (SBE). The SBE is an administrative agency which hears ap-
peals from denials by the FTB of claims for refunds, CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 26077 (Deer-
ing's 1970), and claims for deficiency assessments, CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 25667
(Deering's 1970).
132. See notes 109-26 supra.
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a unitary relationship is present is often the "subjective opinion" of
an auditor or of a court years after the transaction at issue oc-
curred. 
133
3. International Application of the Unitary Business Concept.
The capricious 34 and arbitrary 135 nature of the unitary concept is
magnified in its international application because a distortion 136 re-
sults in the application of the three factor apportionment
formula 137 to the combined domestic and foreign income of a uni-
tary group of companies. Furthermore, because there is a split of
authority, it is difficult for domestic and foreign corporations to
predict what steps to take in order to avoid the -unitary tax as the
cases go in both directions.
In the case of Appeal of Beecham 3 a California subsidiary
was included in a unitary business with its parent, an English phar-
maceutical house with subsidiaries in Canada, Argentina, Mexico,
Brazil, Venezuela, and Australia.' 39 Beecham owned 100 percent
of the stock in all the subsidiaries and exercised absolute control in
electing the directors."4 "Mutuality of interest" throughout the
"affiliated Beecham family" was further assured by the exchange of
research and product information, common trademark usage and
inter-company product flow. 4 1 Pursuant to the California stat-
ute, 142 the conglomerate's worldwide income was included in the
apportionment formula to determine the state tax liability of the
California subsidiary.
143
Appeal of Scholl, Inc.'" has a contrary holding. There it was
held that Scholl was not a unitary business despite the shared usage
of the Scholl trademark and the majority ownership of stocks by
the-'Chicago-based parent in eighteen overseas subsidiaries. These
two elements, considered to be significant in Beecham,I 5 were held
133. Hearing on HR. 5076, supra note 92, at 183.
134. Id. at 21I.
135. Id.
136. Distortion is caused by higher wage rates and property values in the United States,
skewing the formula to attribute too much income to the taxing state. Id. at 165.
137. Payroll, property and sales. See notes 95-97 supra.
138. CAL. TAX. REP. (CCH) 205-634 (S.B.E. 1977).
139. Id. 11 205-635.
140. Id.
141. Id. 14,897-14,898.
142. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25101 (Deering's 1970).
143. Id.
144. CAL. TAX. REP. (CCH) $ 206-000 (S.B.E. 1978).
145. See notes 138-43 supra.
Vol. I11
19
Papas: Immigration as an Intra-Company Transferee and the Pitfall of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,
IMMIGRATION AS AN INTRA-COMPANY TRANSFEREE
to be "significantly reduced by other factors" in the Scholl case.' 4 6
Of vital importance was the testimony of the parent company's
comptroller of twenty-four years. He testified that he had sched-
uled a trip to the London office' 47 but was advised not to come
when its director informed him, "I do not want anyone from Chi-
cago looking over my shoulder." 4 ' Five years later the comptroller
was permitted to visit the London branch but was not allowed to
inspect the books of any of the subsidiaries.'49 In its opinion the
SBE considered this testimony "particularly illuminating" "I as evi-
dence of the absence of centralized control between the parent cor-
poration and its subsidiaries. Other factors which the SBE
considered in its holding included the "independent and parallel"
development of the foreign and domestic markets, 5' the absence of
an international advertising department,' 52 and the absence of any
transfer of employees among the various subsidiaries.'53
4. Evaluation of the Unitary Tax
The negative impact of the worldwide application of the uni-
tary tax should not be underestimated by multinational business
entities.'54 While this method of taxation may produce equitable
results at the domestic level, it does not do so at the international
level.
First, the unitary method of taxation subjects multinational
taxpayers to "time-consuming and costly"' 55 administrative bur-
dens in order to determine the proper amount of income allocable
146. Appeal of Scholl, Inc., supra note 144, at 14,909-107.
147. The Scholl subsidiaries in the Eastern hemisphere were directed from London by
Frank J. Scholl, Sr., who was the chief executive solely responsible for making all managerial
decisions and implementing them through his subordinates. Accounting was done locally by







154. (A) States which apply the unitary concept to corporations located within the
United States (domestic): Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Main, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia. (B) States which apply the unitary concept to corporations
located within and/or outside the United States (worldwide): Alaska, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon,
Utah. Hearing on HR 5076, supra note 92, at 358-59.
155. Id. at 254.
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to California. Smaller companies based outside the United States
find compliance with California's accounting requirements more
onerous because a different method of accounting from that prac-
ticed in their own jurisdictions is often required and they frequently
lack the personnel to do the work.'56 Moreover, this tax informa-
tion may be difficult for the foreign taxpayer to obtain and may
also violate the corporate policy and laws of foreign jurisdictions. 1
57
Second, the unitary method "assumes that all the diverse units
of a worldwide business operate in a homogeneous market where
every dollar spent. . . will earn profits at approximately the same
rate."'58 This is an erroneous economic assumption.' 59 The uni-
tary method fails to observe that property costs and wages in the
United States are generally higher than almost anywhere else in the
world which attributes more income to affiliates in the United
States than to those in other locations. 60 Distortion of the appor-
tionment factors is the inequitable result.
Third, the distortion produced by the unitary tax results in
"unwarranted double taxation."' 16 1 This offends accepted interna-
tional standards of income allocation and determination as set forth
in the 1977 OECD Model Income Tax Convention 162 for the avoid-
ance of double taxation in which the United States and its major
trading partners are members. The unitary tax also contravenes in-
ternational custom as the United States is the only major country to
employ this tax system.'
63
Fourth, the unitary tax significantly deters foreign investment
in California."6 While the tax burden is not the only factor in-
volved in a company's decision to locate in California, it is one of
the factors considered. 165 Specifically, Rolls Royce recently consid-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 226.
158. Id. at 259.
159. Id.
160. Peterson & Walsh, supra note 107, at 113.
161. "Distortion arises because the system is not designed to recognize the higher rate of
return necessarily earned in high risk locations like Iran or Nicaragua. The result is the
attribution of foreign income which has already been taxed to the taxing state and taxing it
again. No foreign tax credit is used at the State level." Id. at 165, 260.
162. Id. at 179, 304 & 391.
163. In the international setting, the custom of States is persuasive evidence of the stan-
dard of reasonable conduct. The overwhelming practice of foreign taxing jurisdictions of the
United States government, and of the major industrial states is to require separate tax ac-
counting for the income of the enterprise maintained in a taxing jurisdiction. 1d. at 311-12.
164. Id. at 144 & 151.
165. Id. at 145.
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ered establishing a new aircraft engine plant in California but de-
cided against it because of the unitary tax.' 66 Sony Corporation's
chairman, Mr. Akio Morita, personally attempted to persuade the
State of California that its tax policy discouraged foreign invest-
ment. 167 Likewise, other Japanese manufacturers are investing in
states with more favorable tax structures, such as Tennessee.
168
III. PLANNING TECHNIQUES TO AVOID THE IMPACT OF
CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE
POLICIES
It would appear that California's tax laws and immigration as
an intra-company transferee are incompatible, as there is no guar-
antee the foreign executive can maintain his L-1 status and assure
his company's avoidance of the unitary tax. There are some steps
however which should be considered.
Because California tax authorities tend to balance several fac-
tors in deciding whether a business in unitary, the owner of the
overseas firm can minimize the state tax exposure of his company
by breaking up the unity of use. '69 This can be done by:
1. Appointing and maintaining separate boards of directors.
Although affiliated companies may share a common manage-
ment philosophy, they should try to have distinct directors.
The foreign firm should also break up the unity of operation 7 ' by:
1. Setting up independent financing for the California
branch. It should be sufficiently capitalized to obtain its own
line of credit with the banks.
2. Avoiding the use of the same trademark or paying a roy-
alty to the affiliated company for its use.
3. Developing independent research if possible.
4. Avoiding intercompany sales if possible.
5. Avoiding centralization of advertising. A different cam-
paign in each country might be helpful.
6. Diligently maintaining records to show the independence
of services, operations and management as evidence that the
company is not part of a unitary business.' 1
If feasible, all ties except ownership should be eliminated to
166. Id. at 143.
167. Id. at 211.
168. Id. at 144.
169. See note 118 supra.
170. See notes i16-17 supra.
171. Petersen & Walsh, supra note 107, at 116.
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demonstrate that the California business is "completely autono-
mous"'172 from the overseas firm.
If the United States branch were engaged in a completely dif-
ferent type of business from that of the overseas affiliate there may
be sufficient diversity to remove the unitary character of the busi-
ness. However, it may be so far removed from the nature of the
foreign company's business that the INS may hesitate to qualify
any foreign employee for L-1 status as being beyond the law's in-
tention.173 There is no precedent from which to determine just how
diverse from the nature of the foreign firm's business a California
company can be.
Another possibility would be to have the alien owner and a
shareholder of the foreign company set up a California corporation
as individual shareholders and seemingly remove the California
operation from any connection with the overseas business. Thus,
each shareholder could own less than the required fifty-one per-
cent'7 4 and still control both companies. However, under the
"working control" test applied in Appeal of Signal Oil, 17 1 this op-
tion would seem to be foreclosed.
A. Long Term Solutions
1. Challenge the Unitary Tax as Violative of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. Relief could be had from
the problems created by the unitary tax if the United States
Supreme Court were to rule that the unitary system of taxation vio-
lates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.' 76 This solution
may be "too speculative to provide comfort"' 17 7 however, as recent
Supreme Court decisions have gone both ways. In Japan Line, Ltd
v. County of Los Angeles '78 the Supreme Court ruled that Califor-
nia could not impose an ad valorem property tax on Japanese-
owned shipping containers used exclusively to transport cargo in
172. Id.
173. "It was not our intent, for example, to include aliens coming to the United States to
form a new corporation, such as investors who use Group IV to circumvent the unavailabil-
ity of nonpreference number, or aliens who were not managers and executives during their
prior year of employment." Bodin, supra note 86, at 203.
174. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25105 (Deering's 1970).
175. See note 112 supra.
176. "Congress shall have Power... To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
177. Hearing on S. 983 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. 119 (1979) (statement of Senator Cook).
178. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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foreign commerce. 79 The Court reasoned that 1) a risk of multiple
taxation was present since the containers were already subject to
Japanese property taxes and 2) that a state tax on "instrumentalities
of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity. . . and pre-
vent the Federal Government from speaking with one voice"'
8 0
when regulating foreign commerce. Rather than openly declare the
tax unconstitutional, the Court invited a federal legislative solu-
tion.
18 '
Two later cases upheld the state's right to impose a unitary tax
upon a multinational corporation's worldwide income. In Mobil
Oil Corporation v. Vermont Commissioner of Taxes 82 and in Exxon
Corporation v. Department of Revenue of Wisconsin' 8 3 the Supreme
Court upheld the state's right to tax income earned from invest-
ments in foreign affiliates and subsidiaries as constitutional under
the Due Process and the Commerce Clauses.'84 In Mobil Oil the
Court reiterated the rule that the income from a business operating
in interstate commerce is not immune from fairly-apportioned state
taxation so long as there is a "minimal connection" between the
taxing state and interstate activities and a rational relationship be-
tween the income that is taxed and the services provided by the
state. ' 85 The Court then distinguished Mobil Oil from Japan Lines
in that the latter case involved a property tax while Mobil Oil in-
volved an income tax in which the appellant did not argue "dupli-
cative taxation at the international level."' 86  Similarly in the
Exxon case the Court found no risk of multiple taxation in not
segregating Exxon's three principal operating departments - ex-
ploration and production, refining, and marketing - to their situs:
179. Id. at 436.
180. If the state imposes an apportioned tax, international disputes over reconciling ap-
portionment formulas may arise. If a novel state tax creates an assymetry in the interna-
tional tax structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against
American-owned instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions. Id. at 450.
181. Finally, appellees present policy arguments. If California cannot tax appel-
lants' containers, they complain, the state will lose revenue, even though the con-
tainers plainly have a nexus with California; the state will go uncompensated for
the services it . . . renders the containers . . . . These arguments are not without
weight . . . These arguments, however, are directed to the wrong forum.
'Whatever the subjects of this [the commercial] power are in their nature national,
. . . may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress.' Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852).
(d. at 456-57.
182. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
183. Exxon Corporation v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
184. Id.
185. Mobil Oil Corp., supra note 182, at 436-49.
186. Id. at 448.
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"the geographic location of such . . .does not alter the fact that
such income is part of the unitary business of the interstate enter-
prise and is subject to fair apportionment among all States to which
there is a sufficient nexus with the interstate activities of the busi-
ness."'
18 7
In both cases the Court took notice of the continuing contro-
versy of state taxation of foreign source income and of the current
legislative proposals in Congress. It seems that until national legis-
lation is passed the controversy will remain, as the Supreme Court
is not likely to infringe upon the domain of Congress.
188
2. Legislation.: State and Federal. In February of 1979 a bill
was introduced into the California legislature that would have ex-
empted from the unitary tax companies that are 1) created or orga-
nized under the laws of a foreign country, 2) not owned or
controlled by a United States corporation or United States resident,
and 3) have more than eighty percent of their operations outside
the United States.189 While there was support for the bill by such
multinationals as Xerox, Ford Motor Company, and International
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, 9 it died in conference on
August 31, 1980.'
At the federal level several bills curtailing state taxation of for-
eign-source income have been introduced in both the Senate and
the House of Representatives. 92 The Senate bill, known as the In-
terstate Taxation Bill, provides for an optional three-factor formula
for apportioning the income of multinational corporations. 193 The
apportionment factors are to be adjusted accordingly, either by the
state or by the corporation. 9 4 Foreign income is exempt from state
taxation if "substantially all" of the taxpayer's income is derived
from sources outside the United States. The 'substantially all" test
is met if at least eighty percent of the taxpayer's income is derived
from sources outside the United States for the current taxable year
and in each of the preceding two years. Both foreign and American
187. Exxon Corporation, supra note 183, at 230.
188. See supra note 178.
189. California Assembly Bill 525, 1979-80 Sess., introduced by Assemblymen Hughes &
Mori, February 12, 1979.
190. Zak, supra note 112, at 3.
191. Id.
192. H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S.983, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S.1688,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
193. Id See also Feinschreiber, International Aspects of Interstate Taxation: Proposed
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corporations come under the exclusion. 195
The House bill allows states to tax foreign source income only
when it is subject to federal income tax.' 96 During the hearing for
H.R. 5076197 there was testimony that all nine members of the Eu-
ropean Common Market delivered a note to the House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman' 98 urging prompt passage of this bill.
Of this group the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany
are the first, second, and fourth largest foreign investors in the
United States.' 99 Therefore, in order to encourage foreign invest-
ment in the United States it is urged that Congress pass this bill.
H.R. 5076 and S. 1688 have been reintroduced this year.2" S. 983
will be reintroduced later in 1981. No action on either of the bills
will probably occur until the latter half of 1981 when Congress con-
siders the second phase of President Reagan's tax cut bill.20  It is
anticipated that these bills have a good chance of passing.2 °2
IV. CONCLUSION
Foreign companies contemplating establishment of a branch
office in California find themselves at a decisional crossroad. On
the one hand, the intra-company transferee status now allows mul-
tinational businesses to freely transfer international personnel to
the United States on a temporary or permanent basis. On the other
hand, California's imposition of a state tax upon the worldwide in-
come of foreign companies provides a significant disincentive to
foreign investors, particulary in the closely held company situation.
If instead of the formula method the separate accounting method
were used, more foreign companies would be encouraged to invest
in California because their overseas profits would not be subject to
California taxes. Thus, Californians would be provided with more
jobs and the state treasury with more tax revenue. However, the
fear of being subjected to double taxation often causes foreign busi-
195. Id.
196. Hearing on HR. 5076, supra note 92, at 7-8.
197. Id.
198. Rep. Al Ullman, D-Oregon.
199. See note 4 supra.
200. Conversation with Charles Borden, legislative aide for Sen. Charles McC. Mathias,
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nesses to locate in states with more favorable tax structures. 20 3
The policy conflict between federal immigration law and the
tax law of states such as California needs to be resolved. Conflict-
ing state tax rules provide an unwanted diversification in the field
of taxation. The objective of foreign businessmen is uniformity and
predictability in determining their tax liability.2 4 They seek relief
from the additional expense 20 5 and paperwork20 6 of complying with
unnecessarily complicated tax laws so they can remain competi-
tive.20 7 Conversely, state authorities seek to receive their fair share
of the tax burden, to prevent tax evasion, and to hold enforcement
costs to a minimum.20 8
In the absence of federal legislation, foreign owners of closely-
held companies may take certain steps to minimize .their tax expo-
sure by decentralizing corporate services and corporate manage-
ment.209 As this Comment has shown, however, they may find that
immigration as an intra-company transferee may not be possible if
tax planning takes precedence.
If the United States Supreme Court were to rule that the uni-
tary tax violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution the
problem would be eliminated. However, it appears from recent
cases that the Court considers federal legislation to be the most ap-
propriate remedy.210
Another solution would be to initiate a series of tax treaties
between the United States and various countries, thereby restricting
the states from applying the unitary tax to the worldwide profits of
foreign multinationals. While tax treaties are a vital element to the
free international flow of capital and technology, this remedy
would solve the problem on a piecemeal basis.2 t' Of recent note,
the United States-U.K. Income Tax Treaty212 attempted to do that
203. Hearing on S 983 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 119 (1979).





209. See notes 169-72 supra.
210. See note 181 supra.
211. Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, On Six International Tax
Treaties and Protocols, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., at 3 (statement by Sen. McC. Mathias).
212. United States - United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty, December 31, 1975, TAX
TREATIES (CCH) J 8103DB-1 (1979).
The text of Article 9(4) is the following:
(4) Except as specifically provided in this Article:
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via article 9(4) of the treaty. However, the United States Senate
deleted this article and the treaty "went through a prolonged period
of uncertainty in Parliament."213 Parliament's subsequent ratifica-
tion in February of 1980 was conditioned upon reassurances that a
legislative solution to the unitary tax problem would pass in the
United States Congress in the near future.
2t4
Of the various avenues of relief, the legislative approach is the
most promising. What is needed is an equitable solution at the fed-
eral level addressing the extraterritorial taxing power of each state.
Federal legislation has the advantage of solving the problem uni-
formly and efficiently, rather than on a gradual treaty or state by
state legislative basis. As nations become more and more economi-
cally interdependent it is incumbent upon the United States as a
leading commercial force in the world to take the necessary steps to
provide a harmonious international business environment.
Pamela G. Papas
(a) where an enterprise doing business in one Contracting State:
(i) is a resident of the other Contracting State; or
(ii) is controlled, directly or indirectly, by an enterprise which is a
resident of the other Contracting State; and
(b) where the enterprise which is a resident of the other Contracting State is
a corporation, such corporation is neither:
(i) a controlled foreign corporation within the meaning of section 957
of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as it may be amended
from time to time without changing the general principle thereof); nor
(ii) created or organised under the laws of the first-mentioned State or
of any third State or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a corporation which
is a resident of any third State:
then, in determining the tax liability of the first-mentioned enterprise in the
State in which it does business, or in a political subdivision or local authority
of that State, such State, political subdivision or local authority shall not take
into account the income, deductions, receipts or outgoings of a related enter-
prise which is a resident of the other Contracting State or of an enterprise of
any third State which is related to the enterprise of the other Contracting
State, except that this prohibition shall not apply where the first-mentioned
enterprise is a resident of the first-mentioned Contracting State, to the extent
that it owns, directly or indirectly, the capital of the related enterprise.
213. Hearing on H.R. 5076, supra note 92, at 138.
214. Mr. Roger Moate, Member of Parliament, speaking in the House of Commons on
February 18, 1980, during the debate before the final ratification of the treaty, summarized
the feelings of the British at that time:
I hope therefore, that if we agree to the motion tonight and if the Government
proceed [sic] to ratify the treaty, those in the United States Senate will understand
that we are doing so on the basis of trust and are placing an immense amount of
faith in the proposals about which we have heard and in the Senate's determination
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